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RECENT CASES

ABORTION-NATURE

AND

ELEMENTS

OF

OFFENSES-THE

SHOT

HEARD ROUND THE NATION-Defendant, a physician, was convicted
of abortion and conspiracy to commit abortion under a statute
which makes abortion a criminal offense ". . . unless the same is
necessary to preserve her [the mother's] life. . . ."I Cheryl, a
young pregnant unmarried woman, threatned to seek an abortion
in Tijuana unless defendant would help her. Defendant referred
Cheryl to Lairtus, a skilled abortionist, licensed to practice in
Mexico, but not in California; 2 because defendant believed that if
the threats were carried out, ". . . Cheryl's very life [would be]
in danger. ' 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court of California, in a fourto-three decision, after stating that a woman has a fundamental
constitutional right to decide whether to bear a child; held the
statute vague, and thus violative of due process requirements. People
v. Belous, - Cal. 2d-, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3545 (1969).
Abortion, before quickening 4 was not a crime at common
law. 5 In fact, abortion was not made a statutory crime in the
United States until about 1830.6 The abortion statutes were enacted
to alter the common law rule, and made criminal, abortions performed before quickening. 7 While abortion statutes may differ in
some respects (some require proof of pregnancy, s while others do
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1955). This section was amended in 1967. Ch. 327,
§ 3, [1967] Cal. Stats. 1521, to provide for elxceptions as enunciated in the Therapeutic
Abortion Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950'-25954 (West Supp. 1969).
2. Lairtus was living in California at the time the offense in the instant case was
committed.
3. People v. Belous, -C-----Cal.
2d-,
458 P.2d 193, 196, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 356 (1969).
4. Quickening is that point where the mother first feels the movements of the fetus.
It usually occurs between the sixteenth and eighteenth week of pregnancy. C. Means, Jr.,
The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus. 1664-1968: A
Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 412 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Means].
5. E.g., Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204, 39 Am. Rep. 227 (1879) ; Commonwealth v. Parker, 50' Mass. (9 Met.) 263, 43 Am. Dec. 396 (1845) ; State v. Cooper, 22
N.J.L. (2 Zab.) 52, 51 Am. Dec. 298 (1849). See Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1395 (1956).
6. United States v. Vutch, Crim. Nos. 1043-68, 1844-68 (D. D.C. Nov. 10, 1969) ; see
generally R. Lucas, Federar Constitut0onal Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REv. 730 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Lucas]; L. Stern, Abortion:Reform and the Law, 59 J. CaIm. L. 84 (1968).
7. See Statei v. Siciliano, 21 N.J. 249, 121 A.2d 490, 495 (1956).
8. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1948) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 51 (1965);
Miss. ConE ANN. § 2223 (Supp. 1969) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-01 (1960). See Annot., 46
A.L.R.2d 1393, 1397 (1956). See generally M. Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An
Answer to the Opposition, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 285, 310 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Sands], for a summary of abortion statutes.
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not 9), most, like California's and North Dakota's, 0 allow an abortion only to preserve the life of the mother. 1
With the Belous decision, the California Supreme Court led the
way, and the Battle of the Fetus had begun. Sixty-six days after
Belous, the District of Columbia followed California's lead,' 2 and
plans are now being laid for an assault on New York's 139 year old
abortion law.' 3
The first skirmish was fought on the grounds of vagueness. The
test of vagueness has been stated thusly:
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject
to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to
its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant
alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules
of law. And a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application,
violates the first essential of due
4
process of law.1
the ConWhile a criminal statute must be reasonably clear, "...
stitution does not require impossible standards."'' 5 A statute is not
vague merely because it throws upon men the risk of rightly estimating a matter of degree. But, "[w]here a statute is so vague
as to make criminal an innocent act, a conviction under it cannot
7
be sustained.'
9. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-29 (1960); FLA. STAT. AN. § 797.01 (1965);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 19 (1959). See Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1397 (1956).
See generally Sands 310.
10.. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-01 (1960).
11. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-29 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1948);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN.tit.17 § 51 (1965). LA. REv. STAT. § 14:87' (Supp. 1969) does not
recognize any grounds for abortion; nor does MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 19 (1959).
However, the Massachusetts court has implied the "necessary to preserve" exception. Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 53 N.E.2d 4, 5 (1944). TIhe information in this footnote does not take into consideration the ten states which have adopted abortion reform
statutes. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25950 et seq. (West Supp. 1969); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50 (Supp. 1967) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1201 (1969); MD. CODE ANN. art.
43 § 149E (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-1 (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-45.1 (Supp. 1967) ; and according to TimE, Nov. 28, 1969, at 82, col. 3, Arkansas, Delaware, Kansas, and Oregon have adopted liberalized abortion laws.
12. United States v. vuitch, Crim. Nos. 1043-68, 1044-68 (D. D.C. Nov. 10, 1969). While
California had a replacement statute, the District of Columbia did not.
13. Three suits have been combined and set for trial before a three judge federal district court. The Minneapolis Tribune, November 16, 1969, at llB, col. 1. For a history of
New York's abortion law, see generally Means.
14. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ; accord, Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) ; United States v. Harriss 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) ;
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ; State v. Henderson, 156 N.W.2d 700,
706 (N.D. 1968).
15. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947) ; accord, State v. McCorvey, 262
Minn. 361, 114 N.W.2d 703, 706 (1962).
. 16. Nash v. United Staten, 229 U.S. 373 (1913) ; accord, United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612, 618 (1954) ; Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951).
17. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520 (1948).
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As applied specifically to abortion legislation, statutes similar
to California's are void for vagueness, because: (1) the term "necessary to preserve" is not susceptible to a construction consistent
with legislative intent;'s (2) the requirement of certainty is greater
in statutes limiting constitutional rights;' 19 (3) the doctor's ". . . professional judgment [as to whether an abortion is 'necessary to
preserve' the life of the mother] made in good faith should not be
challenged"; 20 and (4) "[t]here is no clear standard to guide
either the doctor, the jury or the Court."' 21
To declare an abortion statute void for vagueness is not the
ultimate, in the constitutional sphere, but the beginning. Other
constitutional arguments have been made. Some of these arguments
are: equal protection of the law, 2 2 the establishment clause, 23 and
the police power. 24 However, it is not the purpose of this comment
to consider these arguments. Nor will this comment take issue with
the state's power to regulate abortions by unlicensed practitioners.
The purpose is to analyze the broader and more fundamental question: Whether the state has a countervailing interest in the protection of the fetus? 25 Stated in the alternative, the issue becomes:
Does a woman have a fundamental right to decide whether she will
bear a child?
A state must show a compelling subordinating interest before
it may prevail, where personal liberties are impinged.26 When such
encroachment is threatened
it becomes the duty of [the] Court to determine whether
the action bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its justifi-

cation

27

Thus, it was argued in Belous:
There is no compelling state interest which justifies overriding the woman's personal liberty (and that of the man's
18. People v. Belous, Cal. 2d, 458 P.2d 194, 197, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3544 357 (1969).
19. Id. at , 458 P.2d at 198, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358; United States v. vuitch, Crim.
Nos. 1043-68, 1044-68 (D. D.C. Nov. 10, 1969).
20. United States v. vuitch, Crim. Nos. 1043-69, 1044-68 (D. D.C. Nov. 10, 1969).
21. Id.
22. See Id.; L. Kutner, Due Process of Aboron, 53 M WN. L. REv. 1, 14 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kutner].
23. See Brief for A.C.L.U. as Amicus Curiae at 32-38, People v. Belous, Cal. 2d,
458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969) and Brief for Armstrong as Amicus Curiae at 2022, People v. Belous, Cal. 2d, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
24. See Brief for Medical Deans as Amicus Curiae at 25-27, People v. Belous,
--- Cal. 2d-,
458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969) (health and morals) [hereinafter
cited as Med. Deans Brielf] and Kutner 14 (morals).
25. People v. Belou, -----cal. 2d, 458 P.2d 194, 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360 (1969).
26. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ; accord, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 196 (1964) ; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). See generally Med.
Deans Brief at 13.
27. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960).
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from the standpoint of family planning) not to be compelled
to bear to term every embryo, not to override the correlative
right of the doctor to medically advise or perform an abortion
step for the medical
when in his opinion that is the proper
28
or physical welfare of the woman.
Those who favor the "rights of the fetus" look to tort law, or
the blood transfusion case. 29 They point to many cases which
give the fetus a cause of action under a wrongful death statute. 0
However, these cases are distinguishable. They hold that a fetus,
which is neither born alive, nor viable before the injury, has no
cause of action under a wrongful death statute.
There are two lines of cases concerning the "rights of the fetus"
under a wrongful death statute. One line is lead by Verkennes v.
Corniea,3 1 the other by Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Company.3 2 The
Verkennes line holds that a stillborn child has an action for wrongful
death providing it was viable at the time the tort was committed.33
These courts reason that at viability the fetus is no longer a potential life but a life capable of an existence separate from that of
its mother.3 4 As one court said, a viable child has
its own bodily form and members, manifests all of the
anatomical characteristics of individuality, possesses its own
circulatory, vascular and excretory systems and is capable
now of being ushered into the visible world.3 5
a part of the
The Drabbels case held that an unborn child is "...
mother until birth and, as such, has no juridical existence." 3 6 Thus,
a child's birth alive may give rise to a cause of action for wrongful
death. This line holds that viability is not controlling. What they
require is the live birth of the child.3 7 To illustrate, one court al28. Brief for Appellant (Supplemental Brief and Reply to Brief Amiet Curiae) at 7,
, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
Cal. 2dPeople v. Belous, -29. E.g., R. Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DrQUESNE L. REV. 125 (1966-67) ; R. Byrn,
Demythologizing Abortion Reform, 14. CATHOLIC LAW. 180 (1968) ; R. Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right To Be Born, 17 W. Ras. L. REv. 465 (1965); J. Noonan, Jr., Amend.
ment of the Abortion Law Relevant Data and Judicial Opinion, 15 CATHOLIC LAW. 124
(1969).
30. E.g., Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958) ; Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497
(1960) ; Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
31. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
32. 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
33. See Hatala v. Marklewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Louisville v.
Stuckenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94 (Ky. 1968) ; Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St.
114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949) ; Annot., 15 A.L.R3d 992 (1967).
34. Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954); accord, Hall V. Murphy, 236
S.C. 257, 113 S.B.2d 790 (1960). See H. Ziff, Recent Abortion Law Reforms (Or Much Ado
About Nothing). 60 J. CRaM. L. 3, 19 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ziff].
35. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 141 (D. D.C. 1946).
36. 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229, 232 (1951).
37. See Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958) ; Smith v. Brennan, 31
N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) ; Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951)
Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Qkla, 1953) ; Annot., 15 A.L.It.3d 992 (1967).

RECENT CASES

lowed damages for the death of a nonviable fetus which lived for
two and one-half hours after a miscarriage. 8
Other legal areas have become involved in the "rights of the
fetus" controversy. In Tennessee a stillborn child was not entitled
to take under a will.8 9 And in New York, it has been said that:
Birth, rather than the date of conception, is the controlling
factor in ascertaining a person beneficially interested in
40
the trust which the grantor is seeking to revoke.
Furthermore, in actions for support before birth, it is the interest
of the prospective mother or parent which the law is protecting,
41
not the "rights of the fetus."'
In the criminal sphere, a fetus is considered a human being,
for the purposes of the homicide statute, when it has become
viable.42 Furthermore, now, as it was at common law, quickening
is the determining factor as to whether or not a pregnant woman,
convicted of a capital crime, will be reprieved. The unquickened
fetus is
neither innocent nor guilty of the crime of her who carries
it, or indeed of any crime, because, not yet being a human
person, it cannot be the subject of guilt or innocence. Once
the foetus has quickened, the felon cum foeta complex
constitutes two distinct human beings. One of them the
quickened foetus, is innocent not only of the other's crime,
43
but of any crime and therefore must be spared her fate.
In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,44
the pregnant woman, a Jehovah's Witness, refused a blood transfusion because of her religious beliefs. The court stated:
We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the
law's protection and that an appropriate order should be
made to insure blood transfusions to the mother in the event
they are necessary . . .4
to save the life of the fetus. The proponents of the "rights of the
fetus" argue that the court illustrated those rights by placing the
38.

Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1967).

39. Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
40. In re Peabody, 5 N.Y.2d 541, 158 N.E.2d 841, 845, 186 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (1959).
41. People v. Belous, -Cal. 2d-,
458 P.2d 194, 202 n.12, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363
n.12 (1969).

42. The conviction of defendant, for aggravated assault on his ex-wife and for rnurdeir
of the fetus she was carrying, was sustained. Keeler v. Superior Court For County of
Arnador, --- Cal. App. 2d-,
43.
Means at 500.

44.
45.

80 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1969).

42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
Id. at -,
201 A.2d at 538.
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".. . right to life above that right which the law so zealously protects, the right of free religious conscience in the mother. '""6
But the woman's freedom of religion was not violated by the
court order. As a federal court explained, it was the voluntary
reception of another's blood which her religion forbade, not a transfusion ordered by the court.4 7 Essentially her religion demanded
suicide when it would not allow the blood transfusion. But as the
court in Georgetown College stated:
The Gordian knot of this suicide question may be cut by
the simple fact that Mrs. Jones did not want to die. Her
voluntary presence in the hospital as a patient seeking
medical help testified to this. Death, to Mrs. Jones, was not
a religiously-commanded goal, but an unwanted side 4effect
8
of a religious scruple. . . . Mrs. Jones wanted to live.
Moreover, the case may be distinguished by the fact that the
mother was eight months pregnant. The fetus was viable. Therefore,
this decision is similar to the wrongful death cases discussed previously. The Raleigh Fitkin case does not stand for the "rights of
the fetus."
The case of Gleitman v. Cosgrove9 a malpractice action, is
frequently relied upon to support the "rights of the fetus." The
mother, in Cosgrove, had contacted rubella (German measles) during
the first trimester of pregnancy. The mother contended that she
could have obtained an abortion, if the physician had informed
her of the possible deformities which might occur in the child.
The child was subsequently born deformed. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that the infant could not recover because damages
could not be ascertained. Also, they held that the difficulty of
ascertaining damages, together with the public policy argument that
a child has a right to life over the parents emotional and financial
injury, barred the parents from recovery. It is impossible to argue
against the rationale of the judge-if Jeffrey could talk, he would
ask for life.50 An opposing case is O'Beirne v. Kaiser Memorial
Hospital, an unpublished decision of the California Supreme Court.
The Court, in that case, ". . . denied a husband's petition to restrain
his wife from obtaining an abortion." 51
46. Brief for Trinkaus as Amicts Curiae at 23, People v. Belous, -Cal.
2d-,
458
P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), reprinted in 15 CATHOLIC .,Aw. 108, 123 (1969).
47. Applitcation of Pres. & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
48. Id. at 1009.
49. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
50. Id. at -,
227 A.2d at 693.
51. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, Dec. 8, 1967, at A-20, col. 1, as reported in, R. Byrn,
Demythologizing Abortion Reform, 14 CATHOLIC LAw. 180, 183 n.18 (1968).
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With the exception of the Cosgrove case, no court has, thus far,
recognized that a state has a countervailing interest in the protection
of the fetus before it quickens, in the reprieve of capital crimes
cases, or reaches viability. In fact, the opposite is true. As we have
seen the courts will not recognize a fetus as a "person" unless it
was viable when injured, or it was injured before viability but born
alive.
Having concluded that the State has no countervailing interest
in the "rights of the fetus" before viability, we must determine
whether the mother has a fundamental right to decide whether to
bear children? Judge Gessell in United States v. Vuitch, stated:
There has been . . . an increasing indication in decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States that as a secular
matter a woman's liberty and right of privacy extends to
family, marriage and sex matters and may well include the
right to remove
an unwanted child at least in early stages
52
of pregnancy.
Among the rights Judge Gessell referred to, are: (a) the right to
marital privacy and family planning through the use of contra54
(c) the right to procreate;5 5
ceptives; 53 (b) the right to marry;
(d) the right to educate one's children in the manner one chooses; 56
and (e) the right to possess obscene matter in one's home. 57 The
rights enunciated in these decisions recognize not only the "private
realm of the family" which the state is not allowed to enter, 58 but
also the fundamental personal right to privacy.5 9 But,
[v]irtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy to some degree. The question in each case
is whether that interference violates a command of the
United States Constitution.6"
It has always been recognized that the life of a pregnant woman
takes precedence over that of an unborn child. 61 Nor must the
danger to the mother's life be imminent. 62 Furthermore, a mere
52. United States v. Vuitch, Crim. Nos. 1043-68, 1044-68 (D. D.C. Nov. 10, 1969);
accord, People v. Belous, --- Cal. 2d, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969).
53. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
54. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
55. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
56. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
57. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
58. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
59. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J. concurring). Mr.
Justice Goldberg; believes these rights may be found in the ninth amendment. For more
Information on the ninth amendment, see generally Note, ConstitutionalAspects of Present Crimnal Abortion Law, 3 VAL. U. L. lrv. 102, 112-14 (1968) ; Note, The Ninth Ameftdinent: Gutdepost to Fundamental Rights, 8 WM. & MARY L. REv. 101 (1966).
60. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967).
61. People v. Belous, ---- Cal. 2d-,
458 P.2d 194, 203, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1969).
62. State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 1221 N.W. 592, 596 (1928).
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"possibility" of suicide may fulfill the requirements of "necessary
to preserve'? the woman's life.6 3 Thus our inquiry narrows. Is the
life of the fetus subordinate to that of the mother, where the
mother's death will not result?
In Griswold v. Conrecticut,64 the United States Supreme Court
struck down Connecticut's anti-contraception statute. The Court held
that a married couple is insured the power to control the size of
their family by using contraceptive devices. The Court posed and
answered the question:
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts
of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy
5
surrounding the marriage relationship.
Several authors have compared the anti-abortion statute, with the
anti-contraceptive statute in Griswold.66 One author has concluded,
that since the court in Griswold
declared unconstitutional a statute which prohibited the
limitation of family size through the use of contraceptives,
the constitutional right to 'raise a family'
must also be a
67
constitutional right to limit family size.
Therefore, he continued, there should be no distinction, before viability, ". . . between the fetus and individual sperm and ovum"; 68
for the prohibition of abortion, in the early months, is as much an
6 9
invasion of marital privacy as is the anti-contraceptive statute.
The mere fact of fertilization should not limit or abolish the
right to decide whether to have a child. 70 A woman should not be
required to use her body as a "baby factory" from conception to
childbirth. 71 Clearly no government may compel the coming
together of the spermatozoa and the ovum.
Why then should the state sanctify the two cells after they
have come together and accord them, over the woman's
objection, all the rights of a human being in esse? 72
The state, by ordering her to produce a child, once she has a
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
7L.
72.

People v. Abarbanel, 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1965).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 485-86.
E.g., Med. Deans Brief at 22L24; Kutner 13; Lucas 761-62; Ziff 23.
Ziff 23.
Id.
Id.
Med. Deans Brief at 22.
Id. at 20-21.
Lucas 759.
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fertilized ovum within her, ". ..
drastically interferes with a woman's right to control the use of her own body. ' 73 "If 'the bedroom
[in Griswold] is a sanctuary of marital privacy, the law cannot
74
regard a married woman's reproductive organs differently."
The Belous decision not only invalidated the "necessary to preserve" type statute, but also placed the validity of any abortion
statute in question. The State does not have an interest in protecting
the fetus before viability, and the woman's right to privacy allows
abortion as she may desire. The fetus has lost the Battle. While the
shot fired at Lexington was the shot heard round the world, the
decision in Belous may well be the shot heard round the nation.
WILLIAM

OBSCENITY-PROTECTION

E.

SHERMAN

OF SPEECH-NECESSITY

DETERMINE OBSCENITY PRIOR TO SEIZURE

OF HEARING TO

OF PROPERTY-The

attor-

ney of the Commonwealth and Chief of Police seized a motion
picture being shown by the lessee of a motion picture theatre. The
lessee brought an action to enjoin the seizure. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted an injunction requiring return of the film and prohibiting the seizure of any
other film until its obscenity had been determined in an adversary
hearing.
The Commonwealth's attorney and Chief of Police appealed. The
Court of Appeals held that an adversary hearing was required to
determine obscenity before seizure of the motion picture and
reversed that portion of the injunction prohibiting seizure of the
film, and ruled that the lessee must make a copy of the film reasonably available to the Commonwealth's attorney. Tyrone, Inc. v.
Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969).
In rendering its decision in this case, the court was quick to
point out that its decision would not determine the obscenity of the
seized movie,' nor the constitutionality of the statute under which
the movie was seized. 2 Thus, the only issue for decision was
whether a hearing on the obscenity of a movie is necessary before
its seizure for use in a prosecution under an obscenity statute.
The defendants sought the injunction against seizure on the
grounds of an alleged violation of First, Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.3
73. Med. Deans Brief at 20-21.
74. Ziff 23.
1. Tyrone, Inc v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639, 640 (4th Cir. 1969).
2. T2he statute under which the movie was seized was VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-227 to
18.1-236.4 (1960).
3. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964

